

need the United Nations, and this resolution allows the President to just notify Congress that, based on the authority granted in this resolution, he has decided to attack Iraq. Furthermore, the broad authority granted in this resolution is inappropriate because of the timing of this vote, less than a month before the election.

Twelve years ago under the first President Bush, the vote to use military force in the Persian Gulf was taken after the election. The timing of this resolution also raises questions because there is nothing shown to be urgent about the situation in Iraq. If the President discovers that the U.S. is in imminent danger, he is already authorized to defend the Nation and no one would expect him to wait for a congressional resolution. If the argument is that the urgency was created a year ago on September 11, the evidence supporting the connection between 9-11 and Iraq is at best tenuous.

In addition to these problems, granting the authority in the resolution is premature because many questions are unanswered. For example, what plans have been made for the governance of Iraq after we win the war? And what chance is there that a regime change will create any better situation than we have now? And to the extent that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, is it a good idea to invade Iraq and place our troops right in harm's way? And what will the war cost, and how will we pay for it?

Eighteen months ago we had the largest budget surplus in American history. Today even without the cost of a war, we are approaching the largest deficit in American history with huge deficits already projected for the next 10 years. So what is the plan to pay for the war? Are we going to cut funds for education and health care? Are we going to raise taxes, or will we just run up additional deficits? And what will the domino effect be? If we attack Iraq, Iraq may attack Israel, Israel will attack back, and then everyone in the Middle East will choose sides, and how will that make us better off than we are now?

If we are to make progress against terrorism, we have to recognize that hate is as big an enemy as complex weapons. That hatred may increase because others will resent the fact that we have chosen to apply rules to others that we are unwilling to have applied to us. We would not tolerate applying regime change to the United States, nor would we accept preemptive strikes as an acceptable international policy. The CIA has now reported that the chance that Iraq will use chemical or biological weapons has actually increased since all of the talk about a war began.

Mr. Speaker, all of these problems persist and questions remain unanswered, and they lead to the same basic uncertainty. What is the plan both before and after the war and what are the consequences? Some have argued that

a vote against the resolution is a vote to do nothing. That is not true. We should act, but based on the information we now have, I believe the wisest course is to proceed with the strategy proposed by Colin Powell, and that is U.N. weapons inspections in Iraq enforced with multilateral military power. That strategy has the support of the international community. It is most likely to actually disarm Iraq; it does not require a massive unilateral invasion force; and it reduces the risk of provoking widespread armed conflict in the Middle East and terrorism in the United States.

I therefore urge my fellow Members to vote against the resolution.

Mr. Speaker, these votes on the Iraq resolution pose difficult questions for all of us. A large part of the difficulty is caused by the Administration's inconsistent policies on what we should do, when we should do it, and whose approval we need. Not many days ago, the Administration articulated the policy that it could proceed unilaterally, without U.N. support, and without Congressional approval, to attack Iraq, with a preemptive strike, without the necessity of an imminent threat to the United States, for the purpose of "regime change". On one recent Sunday, Vice President CHENEY and Secretary of State POWELL articulated inconsistent descriptions of the Administration's policy. This resolution, which the Administration is now supporting, repudiates the initial Administration policy by requiring the Administration to seek both U.N. cooperation and Congressional approval. Last weekend, the Boston Globe began an article on the Administration's position on Iraq with the sentence "As administration officials struggle to reach an agreement with U.S. allies about Iraq, President Bush has been shifting his rhetoric in favor of less aggressive language that emphasizes disarming Saddam Hussein rather than ousting him." So because of these constant changes, formulating a response to the Administration's position has been difficult.

The first question we must address is this: what is the goal? If the goal is to disarm Iraq, I believe that the best way to accomplish that goal would be to utilize the strategy articulated a few weeks ago by Secretary of State POWELL: reinstate U.N. inspections, utilizing the established rules, supported by multilateral military force, if necessary. This policy has the best chance of working. At a minimum, it is an important first step. And it has the support of the international community. If military force is needed to enforce the inspections, it will be targeted, focused and not requiring a massive invasion force; it would be unlikely to provoke widespread warfare all over the Middle East; and it is also just as likely to fulfill the goal of disarming Iraq as widespread bombing.

If, on the other hand, you merely start dropping bombs—how do you even know where to bomb, if you haven't inspected first? If you do know where the weapons are, those locations could be placed first on the inspection list, and if there is any resistance to the inspection, multilateral military force could be targeted to those sites.

But today we are discussing a resolution authorizing the use of force, before inspectors have had an opportunity to do their jobs. Unlike the first Administration resolution offered a few days ago, this resolution does require the

President to cooperate with Congress and to try to work with the U.N. This resolution is not as broad as the previous draft. It is limited to Iraq, not the entire Middle East, but it still gives the President the authority to attack, if he determines it to be necessary and appropriate.

This resolution represents the last opportunity for Congress to have meaningful input in the decision to go to war. And unfortunately there are many problems and unanswered questions with granting this authority now.

The first problem is that although the resolution suggests that the President try to work with the U.N., the provision is unenforceable. The President merely has to notify Congress, if he chooses to launch an attack. If we are truly interested in making sure that the President fully exhausts diplomatic efforts before using force, then the resolution should not authorize a military attack without a subsequent statement from Congress.

There is a consensus in the United States that we should work with the U.N. to the extent possible. But after this vote, Congress will have no opportunity to require meaningful efforts to seek cooperation with the U.N. This is a problem especially because the President has already state his disdain for the U.N. by saying at first that he didn't need the U.N., and when he finally sought U.N. support, he implied that if they failed to support the United States, he would proceed to attack without them. Furthermore, the Administration is now insisting on new, unprecedented rules for inspections, a position which may provoke Iraq into resisting the inspections and creating an unnecessary impasse at the U.N. A more prudent strategy would be to require the President to come back to Congress and explain that he made the good faith effort to work with the U.N.—rather than allowing the President to just notify Congress that based on the authority granted in this resolution, he had decided to attack Iraq.

Furthermore, the broad authority granted by this resolution is inappropriate, because of the timing of this vote—less than a month before the election. This problem is magnified by the fact that nearly all of the President's statements on the need for this resolution have been made at partisan political fundraisers, where he attacks Democratic officeholders. Twelve years ago—under the first President Bush—the vote to use military force in the Persian Gulf was taken after the election. That would be a good model to follow, because then members voted without the interests of personal political considerations competing with the national interests.

The timing of the vote on this resolution also raises questions because there is nothing urgent about the situation with Iraq. We have the same information now that we had 2 years ago. For example, we have known that Iraq has had the capability to build biological and chemical weapons for years; in fact we know this because they bought some of the materials from the United States. Furthermore, no case has been made that there is an imminent threat to the United States. So why is it essential for the President to have the authority to attack Iraq now? If the President discovers that the United States is in imminent danger, he is already authorized to defend the nation, and no one would expect him to wait for a Congressional Resolution. So what is different now? If the argument is that the urgency was